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Abstract—For the last recent years, there has been a 
convergence between computer engineering approaches and 
automation aspects (industrial systems, internet of things) also 
called cyber-physical systems, for the development of process-
based cyber-security strategies. Classically, security studies are 
based on risk analysis. Compared to classical IT approaches, 
the actual process (for instance a nuclear power plant or a 
chemical process) or system (autonomous car, drone) are taken 
into account in our approach for two reasons. The first reason 
is that the vulnerabilities of such systems or processes vary 
dynamically as a function of the time, the second reason is 
because the “standards” context is depending on the 
application domain and relationships with the IEC 61508 
functional safety standard seems relevant. The paper presents 
a state of the art of problematics and proposed some 
approaches to these issues. 
Keywords—cyber-security, industrial systems, internet of 
things, internet of things, functional safety 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper presents a state of the art of problematics 
dealing with cyber-security issues for cyber-physical 
systems. The main problematic of such systems is the 
impact. For classical IT (Information Technology) systems, 
the impact is in the digital field, it can be a denial of service, 
the stealing of data (violation of confidentiality), the 
destruction of systems or data (violation of integrity), but the 
impact is generally not in the physical world. For cyber-
physical systems such as “large” industrial systems, smart 
grids, power plants or “embedded” “things” (embedded 
objects; drones, autonomous vehicles…) the impact of a 
malware or attack maybe to control remotely the object to 
divert it from its mission or to make it behave in a dangerous 
way: in both cases, catastrophic consequences may occur in 
the physical world (accident, death…). 
During many years, industrial systems have not been 
cyber-protected as such, considering that the communication 
and processing architectures of such systems did not require 
to be taken into account. The main reasons were the 
heterogeneity of architectures (specific PLCs (Programmable 
Logic Controllers) and Operating systems, specific industrial 
networks) completely different of the ones used for 
Information Systems (classical computers and servers, 
TCP/IP networks). For this reason the main security strategy 
was based on “obscurancy” considering the fact not to be 
connected on a network as enough to be cyber-protected. The 
emergence of specific malwares such as Stuxnet discovered 
in 2008 [1] has changed the philosophy of cyber-security of 
industrial systems: Stuxnet was a Trojan-based virus 
exploiting four 0-day vulnerabilities (0-day means non 
detectable and with no possible protection mechanism) 
concerning propagation with a USB key for the first one, the 
print spooler of Windows for the second one and the last 2 
vulnerabilities allowing increasing privileges to reach the 
administrator level to change code in the SCADA 
(Supervisory control and data acquisition) systems. The 
purpose of Stuxnet was to attack a precise configuration of 
the Simatic system used in some PLCs. The final target was 
a nuclear power plant in a tierce country. 30 000 computers 
were infected at the time… Flame is another malware 
discovered in May 2012 [2]. HavexRAT [3] was also a 
Trojan-based virus, it was an attack done against the energy 
sector in a tierce country. One of the purposes was to gain 
access to devices used for ICS (Industrial Control 
System)/SCADA. Many of the recent high-profile security 
incidents such as the Stuxnet worm [4] and the 
CrashOverride [5, 6] attacks are instances of such process-
oriented attacks [7].  
Embedded systems (internet of things) are also another 
important aspect nowadays: they invade everyday life: 
smartphones, connected toys, augmented reality. More 
complex systems are also present with more and more 
computers or digital electronics (automotive, household 
appliances), including critical functions as it is usually the 
case in transport [8]. The way to protect such systems, which 
can be vulnerable due to the difficulty of implementing 
locally protection programmes, and also because their impact 
may be severe (accident of an autonomous car due to 
hacking), is also at this time a real challenge. 
In the remaining we define cyber-physical systems as 
systems which are controlled and/or monitored in the digital 
world; the controlled system is in the physical world, it can 
be a large process or an embedded system.  
In the paper we refer to cyber-security as the possibility 
to circumvent the normal functioning of systems, by mean of 
actions in the digital world. It means that we don’t take into 
account physical attacks such as direct destruction or direct 
electromagnetic jamming for instance. 
The next section presents the concepts of dependability 
and functional safety. Dependability is important from our 
point of view since cyber-security issues to cyber-physical 
systems may bring to a catastrophe. Functional safety was 
developed in order to take account of the evolutions of 
technology, in particular the use of embedded micro-
controllers and communication networks. Section III deals 
with risk analysis. To envisage protection means to know 
from which danger or unexpected event we want to be 
protected against. Risk analysis allows the classification of 
risks according to their occurrence probability and severity, 
followed by an action plan defining what are the priorities in 
terms of security. Section IV explains what are the steps to 
respect in order to have an attack to succeed and give some 
inputs about cyber-physical systems. Section V proposes an 
approach based on IDS to protect more generally 
communication and information infrastructures and more 
specifically industrial systems. Section VI gives some 
information about various network protocols which are used 
in the field of cyber-physical systems. In section VII are 
discussed some aspects relative to security audits with some 
specific view about cyber-security of industrial plants. 
II. DEPENDABILITY AND FUNCTIONAL SAFETY 
Dependability or RAMSS is generally considered as 
composed of four attributes: Availability, Reliability, 
Maintainability, Security and Safety) [9]. The main purpose 
of dependability is to be able to give an estimation, a 
probability for the system under study to behave as expected 
as far as these RAMSS attributes are concerned. This 
approach is used in many fields, particularly for many years 
it has been used in mechanical engineering, thermal 
engineering, analog electronics… The widespread of digital-
based technologies (in the 90s micro-controllers and DSPs in 
order to allow the design of smart or intelligent devices or 
systems, communication networks) changed the paradigm of 
dependability because such systems are dynamical systems 
with a more complex architecture than the traditional series 
or parallel architectures. The development of the 
dependability issues for such systems was more difficult 
[10].  
Functional safety, in particular around the IEC-61508 
standards [11] and its derivative gave a frame to study this 
new category of digital-based systems. Functional safety of 
cyber-physical systems is a delicate subject, both 
scientifically and on the societal dimension [8]. Evaluating 
functional safety consists in giving a value to quantify the 
level of risk associated with the use of such an architecture 
according to the mission that it should achieve. This level of 
risk is characterized by the consequence on the human or 
material environment of dangerous situations, as well as by 
the probability or possibility of occurrences that such a 
situation may occur. At the societal level, automated or 
computerized systems are present everywhere and their 
relative risks should be studied.  
Cyber-physical systems are composed of communication 
networks, embedded smart sub-systems, distributed 
diagnosis functionalities. If we consider the communication 
aspect, [10] traditionally two types of approaches are 
proposed: “classical” approaches in which the 
communication network is totally ignored [12] and network-
centric approaches where the network performance is studied 
without taking account of the application [13] [14]. In 
“classical” approaches, faults are considered as permanent 
nature, and the system failure is defined as a function of the 
failure of the components and their logics of operation. In 
network approaches, the failure is defined as the non-respect 
of the delivery time of a message. The use of networks and 
digital electronic components in replacement of some 
mechanical parts (eg X-by-Wire in vehicles) or analog 
electronic devices makes the system more sensitive to 
disturbances and requires specific protections. Transient 
faults may occur in such systems and have an impact on the 
reliability of the system. This transient dimension is 
interesting from the point of view of cyber-security because 
they can be considered as transient vulnerabilities which as a 
consequence may be considered as threats, or contextual 
threats. 
In previous works [10] we have shown there is a 
relationship between the reliability of the whole system and 
the probabilities of delays or loss of messages in the network. 
One difficulty with this type of study is that faults affecting 
the network do not always have the same effect; for example 
in a closed loop distributed around a network loss of 
messages in the transitional phase does not have the same 
effect as during the steady state. We are in a situation of 
“dynamic reliability” because the relationship between the 
system failure and failures of components change over time. 
In this previous works, we have proposed a modelling of the 
system behavior considering the presence of a constant delay 
in the loop (robustness study, stability limit ...). In industrial 
reality, the network disturbances are random, the elements 
connected to the network function asynchronously and 
several message exchanges may be necessary in the same 
sampling period. The consequence is that in general an 
analytical study is hardly feasible. The ability of control 
systems to compensate the effects of certain component 
failures (like the network) leads to a redefinition of the 
concept of system failures. The consequence is that the 
assessment of reliability of the system is dependent on the 
functional evaluation and becomes more difficult if not 
impossible with the traditional methods. To overcome these 
difficulties, an approach combining modelling (based on 
Petri nets, Stochastic Activity Networks) and simulation may 
be used and we proposed some in the past [15, 16, 17]. The 
Monte Carlo approach is generally used for the statistical 
evaluation of the parameters dependability through many 
simulations (or stories). 
III. RISK ANALYSIS 
Risk analysis involves the development of an assessment 
of risk combinations through the collection and integration of 
information relating to scenarios [8], it is based classically on 
occurrence frequencies of events and consequences of these 
events if they occur. It is a major component of risk 
management in a company. It is generally admitted that a 
hazard and risk analysis must be performed from the design 
stage for the process. This analysis relates to the description 
of dangerous events, to the description of the consequences 
of these events, the determination of the requirements for the 
reduction of this risk, the assignment of safety to protective 
layers, etc. This risk analysis is intended to be an instrument 
of prevention and protection and in the form of methods 
involving phases of identification, evaluation and hierarchy 
[18]. 
The risk reduction must be achieved in order for the risk 
to be tolerable despite a dangerous situation. The purpose of 
determining the tolerable risk of a dangerous event is to 
indicate what is reasonable in relation to the frequency of the 
dangerous event and its consequences. When a risk is 
described as unacceptable, prevention methods are used in 
this case. 
Accident prevention refers to the elimination of hazards 
or the reduction of the occurrence of unexpected events by 
improving the security of control or by the establishment of 
means preventing the appearance or propagation of dangers 
(such as Safety Instrumented Systems ...). Protection comes 
after the failure of prevention means and it relates to the 
mitigation of the consequences of an accident by means 
limiting the damages (emergency systems, emergency 
procedures). Levels of protection are designed to reduce the 
frequency of the hazardous event and its consequences. 
In the field of cyber-security, three concepts are taken 
into account for cyber-security [19]: 
- Asset: Represented by monetary value, they are 
considered as anything of worth that can be 
damaged, compromised, or destroyed by an 
accidental or deliberate action; a asset’s worth is 
generally far more than the simple costs of 
replacement (image, legal issues…). 
- Threat: potential event that, if realized, would cause 
an undesirable impact; two factors plays in the 
severity of a threat: degree of loss and likelihood of 
occurrence. 
- Vulnerability: absence or weakness of cumulative 
controls protection in a particular asset, it is 
estimated as percentages based on the level of 
control weakness. 
To conclude on the aspect of the severity-probability relation 
really widespread in the field of dependability, we can 
complete by considering that in the field of cyber-security it 
is not easy to have a good estimation of the probability 
because it is strongly related to some specific contexts 
(cyber-war, economic competition…). If we consider 
attacks, the question is not just the probability of being a 
victim of an attack. The question is that we want to protect 
the assets from an attack considered as sufficiently probable, 
for which we will be interested in the difficulty of attack, 
linked to the probability for the attack to succeed. 
IV. CYBER-ATTACKS 
A cyber-attack is considered as a malicious action 
designed to impair security. An attack is the realization of a 
threat, and it needs a vulnerability exploit. An important 
aspect is that an attack could occur (and succeed) only if 
there is a vulnerability. In the field of cyber-security we used 
to define two types of targets for cyber-attacks. Convenient 
target means that the attacker is searching for resources and 
is not strongly interested by the target as such. Chosen 
targets are the real targets, which means this is the purpose of 
the attacker to reach this target in order for instance to steal 
information (violation of confidentiality) or to modify some 
data (violation of integrity). In the case of cyber-physical 
systems, because their architecture are generally more 
specific, these systems are more sensitive as chosen targets 
(more rarely as convenient targets), and more specially to the 
violation of integrity, because some attackers wants to 
change the configuration files or because of some attempts to 
try to upload corrupted software or firmware. 
In order to achieve an attack on a chosen target, a hacker 
uses a strategy in 6 steps: 
- Recognition and collection of information: Domain 
names, DNS servers, blocks of assigned IP 
addresses, public IP addresses, www, ftp, e-mail…, 
types of machines and OS on which the services are 
carried out, mechanisms available for the control of 
the access to the network, Type of firewall and IDS 
(Intrusion Detection System)… Cartography of the 
network, using SNMP, type of access connections 
- Scan of the services and ports 
- Enumeration: extraction of information on the valid 
accounts and the resources, network resources and 
shared resources, users and groups (as a function of 
the Operating system), appliances, character strings 
sent in response by the equipment 
- Obtaining an access: use of the functionalities of the 
O.S., use of the functionalities of software, 
benefiting from a bad configuration, “Opened” 
system, default configuration (administrator name 
and password!), functionalities activated by default, 
scripts available on the system and sometimes 
activated by default (Unix/Linux), Hijacking SQL 
queries when querying a database via web interface, 
automated Attack (ex: scan of port 80 of a whole C-
class block of addresses in order to seek a fault) 
- Extension of the acquired privileges : to carry out 
code to obtain privilege, to seek to decipher other 
passwords, to scan for non ciphered passwords, to 
seek possible inter-network relations, to identify 
badly configured files or shared resources 
permissions 
- Cover the traces: to dissimulate to the administrator 
the fact that one penetrated the system,  to eliminate 
the entries (inputs) in the event logs and the 
registers, to empty the file of history.  
In the field of cyber-physical systems, it needs specific 
hackers with the knowledge or experience about specific 
software, firmware or Operating systems used in such 
applications. From this point of view it is more difficult 
because there are at this stage less experts, but generally 
these systems are also not so much protected.  
The main categories of attacks are denial of service, 
identity spoofing, protocol bypass, sniffing, man-in-the-
middle. 
For cyber-physical systems, the main aspect concerns the 
potential impact on the physical component, which may be 
the result of a classical IT attack but also of a more specific 
attack like using vulnerabilities in an industrial software, 
taking account of the stability limit of a controlled system 
(aircraft, vehicles) achieving a mission, changing the value 
of some sensors in order to provide the control algorithm a 
wrong view of its environment and situation, change values 
in the mission, upload of an unexpected software or 
firmware, etc… We may see from this list that some issues 
are strongly related to the classical IT world whereas some 
others are specific to cyber-physical systems and their 
functioning modes and contexts. 
V. CYBER-PROTECTION OF INFRASTRUCTURES AND 
INDUSTRIAL SYSTEMS USING IDS PROBES 
In order to protect IT infrastructures, we may use 
Intrusion Detection Systems. Two categories of IDSs exist. 
Network-based IDSs (NIDSs) reside on a discrete network 
segment and monitor the traffic on that segment. They 
usually consist in a network appliance with a network 
interface card (NIC) that is intercepting and analyzing the 
network packets in real time. NIC are generally in 
promiscuous mode, this is a « furtive » mode in order not to 
use any IP address. Host-based IDSs (HIDS) use small 
programs that reside on a host computer (web server, mail 
server…) in order to monitor the operating system and detect 
inappropriate activities. Signature-based IDSs use a signature 
or attributes that characterize an attack which are stored for 
reference (if there is a match, a response is initiated). 
Statistical anomaly-based or behavior-based IDSs 
dynamically detect deviations from the learned patterns of « 
normal » user behaviour and trigger an alarm when an 
intrusive activity occurs. 
In paper [21] one of the problematics is what is the better 
way to locate the IDS (Intrusion Detection Systems) probes. 
If the processing is centralized, the probes are not considered 
exactly as IDS but a minimal processing is achieved at the 
level of the probe and a centralized IDS is in charge to 
achieve the analysis. It is possible this way to achieve a 
correlation between several points in the network. In this 
case the centralized IDS should be able to process the 
complete traffic of the industrial process. Another approach 
consists in using probes as complete IDSs analyzing locally 
the traffic and sending only alerts at the higher level. To this 
aim the authors have integrated Modbus within Suricata as a 
proof of concept. In order to generalize the work, it is 
necessary to achieve the same type of works on other 
protocols such as Profinet. 
If we consider the use of IDS in the field of Industrial 
Control Systems, the following classification has been 
provided by [7]. In the cyber domain, the communication-
based approaches [22, 23, 24, 25] are interested in the 
vocabulary and grammar of industrial protocols, these 
approaches are based on the knowledge we have about the 
protocol mechanisms and are really relevant in the case of 
deterministic processes.  Flow-based approaches are closer to 
the approaches used in the IT field, [26, 22, 27, 28] focus on 
the detection of irregular flows within the ICS. Telemetry 
oriented approaches [28, 29, 30, 31] focus on building a base 
profile of network exchanges using statistical measures or 
classification models. Compared to communication-based 
approaches, intelligent nodes based approaches [32, 33, 34, 
35] are relatively scarce. This can be explained by the 
specificity of the components in an ICS, the limited memory 
and computing resources, as well as instrumentation, for 
instance the authors in [32] develop an intrusion detection 
approach based on the analysis of the execution time of tasks 
in real-time devices. The other category is composed of the 
Physical domain oriented approaches which take into 
account incorrect behaviors at the level of the physical 
process without generating overtly abnormal behavior in the 
cyber domain, this type of IDS approaches incorporate more 
knowledge about the physical process [36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 
41]. Finally, a number of works [42, 43, 44] cover multiple 
aspects of the above taxonomy. Such a wide coverage is 
motivated by the need to detect sophisticated attacks, identify 
accidental deviations, and reduce false positives. 
VI. SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON THE NETWORK FOR CYBER-
PHYSICAL SYSTEMS 
Networks are an important part of cyber-physical systems 
and these networks may be really various as a function of the 
application field such as classical TCP/IP networks, 
industrial networks, wireless networks, mobile networks 
[45]… Another general division of the network could be as 
follows [46]: 
- deterministic networks, 
- non-deterministic networks. 
In deterministic networks we can foresee the time of 
transmission of the required amount of data as well as delay 
appeared on the network. An example of deterministic 
network is WorldFIP. In case of non-deterministic network 
there are random delays and we cannot determine the exact 
time of transmission. The common communication network 
could be represented by Ethernet. Ethernet uses CSMA/CD 
(Carrier Sense Multiple Access / Collision Detection) 
[standard IEEE 802.3] [47] mechanism for access on 
communication medium. This mechanism is realized at the 
2nd layer of ISO/OSI model [48]. The main principle of this 
kind of access mechanism is collision detection by node 
when the information is sent. When another signal is 
detected on the medium, then the transmission of the packet 
is interrupted and a jam signal is sent. At this moment, each 
node is waiting for a random time interval. The performance 
parameters are sufficient when the network loading is low. 
Increasing the amount of data which should be transmitted 
on the network (network loading) increases, in the same 
time, the number of collisions. Thus, the corrupted packets 
must be retransmitted and the network is gradually 
overloaded.  
Ethernet network with CSMA/CD mechanism has worse 
performance parameters in comparison with industrial 
networks, when the network is high loaded. For example, 
with the same bit rate as in technological networks, the 
Ethernet network is not able to transmit required data within 
the required time intervals [49] [50]. Ethernet is a type of 
non-deterministic network. This feature is given by the 
inability to foresee delays caused by the network due to its 
medium access method. In order to prevent undesirable 
features and increase the dependability of the whole Network 
Controlled System (NCS), special networks were designed 
for industrial applications. There are several types of used 
control networks: 
- CAN, CANopen, DeviceNet – represents the network 
with CSMA/CR [48] or CSMA/AMP [51] medium access 
method, 
- PROFIBUS, ControlNet, FlexRay – represents token 
passing networks with TDMA medium access method, 
- Industrial Ethernet and other modifications such as 
EtherCAT or Ethernet PowerLink (EPL). 
The difference in approach is covered by different access 
mechanisms for the nodes connected to the network. 
Generally, the most known technological networks apply 
CSMA/AMP (CAN) or TDMA (token passing bus / ring) 
medium access method. There are some modifications based 
on conventional communication network structure. 
Popularity of the classical Ethernet pushes it in industrial 
application. In order to be able to accomplish requirements 
given by its application within NCS, some features have to 
be modified. The choice of a suitable type of control network 
(deterministic or non-deterministic) depends on network 
performance parameters given under different conditions. An 
important aspect is the dynamic of the controlled system as 
well as the complexity of the systems, number of 
components connected to the network and others which 
should not be ignored when the NCS is designed. 
As far as cyber-security is concerned, we can consider 
that a determinist network is generally more robust or 
resilient to denial of service attacks for instance, because we 
have a control of the temporal aspects. Temporal aspect is an 
important issue for cyber-physical systems and so a potential 
source of vulnerabilities. 
Until recently [52], few industrial protocols have 
proposed security mechanisms (integrity control more robust 
than a CRC, authentication or data encryption). Among 
protocols proposing security mechanisms, there are DNPSec, 
OPC UA, IEC 61850. DNPSec is the secured version of 
DNP3, allows the authentication of devices and to ensure 
data integrity by using certificates, hash functions and TLS 
(Transport Layer Security). OPC UA (OLE for Process 
Control Unified Architecture) aims at being used by all the 
operational components of an ICS (PLCs, HMI, SCADA 
servers and clients, and any component using an OPC server 
or client). Contrary to othe OPC protocols, OPC UA is not 
based on DCOM for various reasons, among which the 
security of the protocol. OPC UA contains mechanisms to 
ensure authentication, confidentiality and integrity of 
exchanged data. IEC 61850 is a standard specifically devoted 
to Smart Substation Automation Systems. Standards take 
account of cyber-security of exchanges, by using TLS, hash 
and certificates. We have shown in previous works [53] how 
IEC 61850 protocol is not secured and how it is possible to 
bypass in particular some temporal restrictions.  
VII. AUDIT 
Audits are used to analyse [19] the strength, weakness of 
organisations, plants, institutions… In this paper we are 
interested about cyber-security audits.  This section reminds 
what is a cyber-security audit, and we will give some inputs 
for cyber-security of industrial plants.   
Cyber-security IT audits are based in the IEC 27002 
standard [54]. An audit is a specific procedure, this 
procedure should be agreed by the parties and documented 
clearly. The limits of the audit should be strongly defined. 
The audit is composed of several parts. The first part is 
dedicated to the security policy, the saving policy, the 
disaster recovery. Several parts are then dedicated to the 
various parts of the information system: data centers, servers, 
rooters, firewalls, operating systems, databases, applications, 
WLAN, mobile devices. 
For industrial systems [52], ANSSI (Agence nationale de 
la sécurité des systèmes d'information, 
https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/) in France has published in 2014 
some referentials for industrial systems. ANSSI has defined 
some requirements audit providers should respect to audit 
“OIV” (Opérateurs d’intérêts vital). Cyber-security audits for 
industrial plants should be conducted according to standards, 
either generic (ISO 27000) or specific (NIST 800-82, NERC 
CIP for production and transport of electricity, IEC 62443) 
but also using the ANSSI referential ANSSI14 which will be 
compulsory for “OIV”.  
Finally, for IT as well as for Industrial architectures, pen 
tests may be achieved to test the conformity of the 
installation to the expected level of cyber-security. 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this paper is to give a state of the art and 
problematics of cyber-security of cyber-physical systems. 
Due to the cyber-physical aspects with impact in the physical 
world, the link with dependability and safety, especially 
functional safety, is natural even if the methodologies are not 
completely available yet. Risk analysis is the tool classically 
used in the field of dependability to have an estimation of the 
risks, their probabilities and severities. Cyber-threats are then 
presented, in order to understand how a system can be 
attacked to well protect it. Some general aspects on how to 
protect the infrastructure are then proposed. Properties of 
various network protocols are then discusses. The last section 
deals with security audit, which is an approach to be used to 
get an objective evaluation, from a tierce-party, about the 
actual level of security of a system. 
Some other issues need to be taken into account, in 
particular the issue of embedded systems and the way to 
implement cyber-security resources in autonomous 
embedded systems with limited calculation and sometimes 
energy resources.  
As a whole, this question of cyber-security of cyber-
physical system remains an open problem. Methodologies 
such as the one of the 27005 standards [55] may be used as a 
framework for the cyber-physical systems, but the 
knowledge about the controlled process, its behaviour, the 
potential vulnerabilities of the behavior, are some points 
which should be taken into account, which means a 
convergence between IT specialists and automation experts. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
The authors would like to thank the PhD students which 
worked with us these last years on these subjects: Rony 
Ghostine, Abdelhak Mkhida, Jan Galdun, Maëlle Kabir-
Querrec, Insaf Sassi, Oualid Koucham, Tran Trun Duc. 
REFERENCES 
[1] “Stuxnet”, in L’Informaticien, Nov. 2010. 
[2] L. Bloch, C. Wolfhugel, A. Kokos, G. Billois, A. Soullié, A. Anzala-
Yamakajo, T. Debize, Sécurité informatique, pour les DSI, RSSI et 
administrateurs, 5ème edition, Eyrolles, 2016. 
[3] M. Cislo, Virus and industrial processes, WINS/CNMS Bachelor 
memoir, Univ. Grenoble Alpes, Grenoble, 2015. 
[4] N Falliere, L. O. Murchu, and E. Chien. W32.stuxnet dossier. 
https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_r
esponse/ whitepapers/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf, 2011. [Online, acc. : 
March-2018]. 
[5] US-CERT. Crashoverride. https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-
163A, 2017. [Online, acc. : March-2018] 
[6] Dragos. Crashoverride: Analysis of the threat to electric grid 
operations. lhttps://dragos.com/blog/crashoverride/, 2017. [Online, 
acc. : July-2018] 
[7] O. Koucham, Détection d’intrusions pour les systèmes de contrôle 
industriels, thèse de Doctorat, Univ. Grenoble Alpes, 2018. 
[8] A. Mkhida, Contribution à l’évaluation de la sûreté de 
fonctionnement des Systèmes Instrumentés de Sécurité intégrant de 
l’Intelligence, thèse de Doctorat, Univ. de Lorraine, 2008. 
[9] J. C. Laprie, Sûreté de fonctionnement et tolérance aux fautes : 
concepts de base, rapport LAAS n°88.287, paru dans les techniques 
de l’ingénieur, 1988. 
[10] R. Ghostine, Influence des fautes transitoires sur la fiabilité d’un 
système commandé en réseau, thèse de Doctorat, Univ. de Lorraine, 
2008. 
[11] CEI 61508. Sécurité fonctionnelle des systèmes électriques, 
électroniques et électroniques programmables relatifs à la sécurité. 
Commission Electrotechnique Internationale, Genève, Suisse, 2000. 
[12] G. Moncelet. Application des réseaux de Petri à l’évaluation de la 
sûreté de fonctionnement des systèmes mécatroniques du monde 
automobile, Thèse de Doctorat, N°3076, Université Paul Sabatier, 
Toulouse, 9 octobre (1998). 
[13] P.J. Portugal, and A. Carvalho. A Stochastic Petri Net Framework for 
Dependability Evaluation of Fieldbus Networks – A Controller Area 
Network (CAN) Example. International IEEE Conference in 
Mechatronics and Robotics, MECROB, 2004. 
[14] Navet, N., Y. Song and F. Simonot. Worst-Case Deadline Probability 
in Real-Time Applications Distributed over Controller Area Network. 
In: Journal of systems Architecture. Vol (46), No. 1, p: 607-617, 
2000. 
[15] J. Galdun, JM Thiriet, J. Liguš, Study of different load dependencies 
among shared redundant systems, International Workshop on Real 
Time Software RTS'2008 within International Multiconference on 
Computer Science and Information Technology IMCSIT'2008, 
October 20–22, Wisla, Poland, pp. 609 – 615, ISSN 1896-7094, 2008. 
[16] R. Ghostine, JM Thiriet JF Aubry, M. Robert, A Framework for the 
Reliability Evaluation of Networked Control Systems, 17th IFAC 
World Congress, July 6-11, pp. 6833-6838, 2008. 
[17] P. Barger, JM Thiriet, M. Robert, Dependablity study in distributed 
control systems integrating smart devices, Low Cost 2004, Ottawa 
(Canada), pp. 79-84, 2004. 
[18] J. Tixier, G. Dusserre, O. Salvi, D. Gaston, ‘Review of 62 risk 
analysis methodologies of industrial plants’, Journal of Loss 
Prevention in the process industries 15, pp. 291–303. 2002. 
[19] C. Davis, M. Schiller, K. Wheeler, IT Auditing: using control to 
protect assets, Mc Graw Hill, 2007. 
[20] E. Cole, R. Krutz, JW Conley, Network security bible, Wiley, 2005. 
[21] D. Diallo, M. Feuillet, Détection d’intrusion dans les systèmes 
industriels : Suricata et le cas de Modbus, CAESAR 2014, website of 
ANSSI, [Online, acc. : October-2018]. 
[22] S. Cheung and K. Skinner. Using Model-based Intrusion Detection 
for SCADA Networks. In Proc. SCADA Security Scientific 
Symposium, pages 127–134, 2007. 
[23] H. Lin, A. Slagell, C. Di Martino, et al. Adapting Bro into SCADA: 
building a specification-based intrusion detection system for the 
DNP3 protocol. In Proc. CSIIRW ’13, pages 1–4, 2013. 
[24] N. Goldenberg and A. Wool. Accurate modeling of Modbus/TCP for 
intrusion detection in SCADA systems. International Journal of 
Critical Infrastructure Protection, 6(2):63–75, 2013. 
[25] A. Kleinmann and A. Wool. Accurate modeling of the siemens s7 
scada protocol for intrusion detection and digital forensics. Journal of 
Digital Forensics, Security and Law, 9(2), 2014. 
[26] R. Barbosa, R. Sadre, and A. Pras. Flow whitelisting in SCADA 
networks. Int. Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, 6(3-
4):150–158, December 2013. 
[27] H. Hadeli, R. Schierholz, M. Braendle, and C. Tuduce. Leveraging 
determinism in industrial control systems for advanced anomaly 
detection and reliable security configuration. In IEEE Conference on 
Emerging Technologies and Factory Automation ETFA 2009, pages 
1–8, 2009. 
[28] S. Ponomarev and T. Atkison. Industrial Control System Network 
Intrusion Detection by Telemetry Analysis. IEEE Transactions on 
Dependable and Secure Computing, 5971(c):1–1, 2015. 
[29] D. Yang, A. Usynin, and J. Hines. Anomaly-based intrusion detection 
for SCADA systems. In 5th Intl. Topical Meeting on Nuclear Plant 
Instrumentation, Control and Human Machine Interface Technologies 
(NPIC&HMIT 05), pages 12–16, 2005. 
[30] R. Ramos, R. Barbosa, R. Sadre, and A. Pras. Difficulties in 
Modeling SCADA Traffic : A Comparative Analysis. In Proceedings 
of the 13th international conference on Passive and Active 
Measurement (PAM ’12), pages 126–135, 2012. 
[31] O. Linda, T. Vollmer, and M. Manic. Neural Network based Intrusion 
Detection System for critical infrastructures. 2009 International Joint 
Conference on Neural Networks, pages 1827–1834, 2009. 
[32] C. Zimmer, B. Bhat, et al. Time-based intrusion detection in cyber-
physical systems. In Proc. First ACM/IEEE Int. Conf. on CPS, pages 
109–118, 2010. 
[33] J. Rrushi and K.-D. Kang. Detecting Anomalies in Process Control 
Networks. IFIP Advances in Information and Communication 
Technology, 311:151–165, 2009. 
[34] J. Reeves, A. Ramaswamy, M. Locasto, S. Bratus, and S. Smith. 
Intrusion detection for resource-constrained embedded control 
systems in the power grid. International Journal of Critical 
Infrastructure Protection, 5(2):74–83, 2012. 
[35] C. Bellettini and J. L. Rrushi. A product machine model for anomaly 
detection of interposition attacks on cyber-physical systems. IFIP 
International Federation for Information Processing, 278:285–299, 
2008. 
[36] D. Hadziosmanovic, R. Sommer, and E. Zambon. Through the Eye of 
the PLC: Towards Semantic Security Monitoring for Industrial 
Control Systems. In Proc. ACSAC 14, 2014. 
[37] N. Erez and A. Wool. Control variable classification, modeling and 
anomaly detection in Modbus/TCP SCADA systems. International 
Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, 10:59–70, 2015. 
[38] A. Carcano, I.N. Fovino, M. Masera, and A. Trombetta. Statebased 
network intrusion detection systems for SCADA protocols: A proof 
of concept. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries 
Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in 
Bioinformatics), 6027 LNCS:138–150, 2010. 
[39] I. N. Fovino, A. Carcano, T. D. L. Murel, A. Trombetta, and M. 
Masera. Modbus/ dnp3 state-based intrusion detection system. In 
Advanced Information Networking and Applications (AINA), 2010 
24th IEEE International Conference on, pages 729–736, April 2010. 
[40] R. Mitchell and I.-R. Chen. Behavior rule specification-based 
intrusion detection for safety critical medical cyber physical systems. 
Dependable and Secure Computing, IEEE Transactions on, 12(1):16–
30, Jan 2015. 
[41] S. Pan, T. Morris, U. Adhikari, Developing a Hybrid Intrusion 
Detection System Using Data Mining for Power Systems. IEEE 
Transactions on Smart Grid, 6(6):3104–3113, 2015. 
[42] R. Berthier, W.H. Sanders, and H. Khurana. Intrusion Detection for 
Advanced Metering Infrastructures: Requirements and Architectural 
Directions. Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm), 2010 
First IEEE International Conference on, 2010. 
[43] M. Parvania, G. Koutsandria, V. Muthukumary, S. Peisert, C. 
McParland, and A. Scaglione. Hybrid control network intrusion 
detection systems for automated power distribution systems. In 
Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN), 2014 44th Annual 
IEEE/IFIP International Conference on, pages 774–779, June 2014. 
[44] C. Zhou, S. Huang, N. Xiong, et al. Design and analysis of 
multimodel-based anomaly intrusion detection systems in industrial 
process automation. IEEE Trans. Systems, Man, and Cybernetics: 
Systems, 45(10):1345–1360, 2015. 
[45] J. Galdun, Dependability Analysis of Networked Control Systems 
with Consideration of Shared Redundant Subsystems, PhD Kosice-
Grenoble, 2008. 
[46] J. Ligušová, JM Thiriet, J. Liguš, P., Barger, Effect of Element 
Initialization in Synchronous Networked control System to Control 
Quality, Reliability and Maintainability Annual Symposium, RAMS, 
p. 135-140, January 2004. 
[47] F-L. Lian, JR Moyne, DM Tilbury, Performance evaluation of control 
networks: Ethernet, ControlNet,and DeviceNet“, IEEE Control 
Systems Magazine, Vol. 21, p. 66 – 83, February 2001. 
[48] D. Paret, Le Bus CAN Aplications CAN, CANopen, DeviceNet, 
OSEK, SDS...“ (in French), ISBN: 2 10 0003659 9, Dunod, Paris, 
1999. 
[49] J. Galdun, R. Ghostine, JM Thiriet, J. Liguš, J. Sarnovský,Definition 
and modelling of the communication architecture for the control of a 
helicopter-drone, 8th IFAC Symposium on Cost Oriented 
Automation, Cuba, February 2007 
[50] A. Tanwani, J. Galdun, JM Thiriet, S. Lesecq, S. Gentil, Experimental 
Networked Embedded Mini Drone - Part I. Consideration of Faults, 
European Control Conference 2007, Kos, Greece, p.: 4332-4337, 
ISBN: 978-960-89028-5-5, July 2007. 
[51] L.-B. Fredriksson, A CAN Kingdom – Rev 3.01, KVASER AB, 
Kinnahult, Sweden, 1995. 
[52] Y. Fourastier, L. Pietre-Cambaceded, Cybersécurité des systèmes 
industriels, Cepadues, 2015. 
[53] M. Kabir-Querrec, Cyber security of the smart grid control systems: 
intrusion detection in IEC 61850 communication networks, thèse de 
Doctorat, Univ. Grenoble Alpes, 2017. 
[54] ISO/IEC 27002:2013, Information technology -- Security techniques -
- Code of practice for information security controls, IEC 2013 
[55] ISO/IEC 27005:2018, Information technology -- Security techniques -
- Information security risk management, IEC 2018. 
 
